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Abstract
When scheduling public works or events in a shared facility one needs to accommodate pref-
erences of a population. We formalize this problem by introducing the notion of a collective
schedule. We show how to extend fundamental tools from social choice theory—positional scor-
ing rules, the Kemeny rule and the Condorcet principle—to collective scheduling. We study the
computational complexity of finding collective schedules. We also experimentally demonstrate
that optimal collective schedules can be found for instances with realistic sizes.
1 Introduction
Major public infrastructure projects, such as extending the city subway system, are often phased.
As workforce, machines and yearly budgets are limited, phases have to be developed one by one.
Some phases are inherently longer-lasting than others. Moreover, individual citizens have different
preferred orders of phases. Should the construction start with a long phase with a strong support,
or rather a less popular phase, that, however, will be finished faster? If the long phase starts first,
the citizens supporting the short phase would have to wait significantly longer. Consider another
example: planning events in a single lecture theater for a large, varied audience. The theater needs
to be shared among different groups. Some events last just a few hours, while others multiple
days. What is the optimal schedule? We formalize these and similar questions by introducing the
notion of a collective schedule, a plan that takes into account both jobs’ durations and their societal
support. The central idea stems from the observation that the problem of finding a socially optimal
collective schedule is closely related to the problem of aggregating agents’ preferences, one of the
central problems studied in social choice theory [3]. However, differences in jobs’ lengths have to
be explicitly considered. Let us illustrate these similarities through the following example.
Consider a collection of jobs all having the same duration. The jobs have to be processed
sequentially (one by one). Different agents might have different preferred schedules of processing
these jobs. Since each agent would like all the jobs to be executed as soon as possible, the preferred
schedule of each agent does not contain “gaps” (idle times), and so, such a preferred schedule can be
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viewed as an order over the set of jobs, and can be interpreted as a preference relation. Similarly,
the resulting collective schedule can be viewed as an aggregated preference relation. From this
perspective, it is natural to apply tools from social choice theory to find a socially desired collective
schedule.
Yet, the tools of social choice cannot be always applied directly. The scheduling model is
typically much richer, and contains additional elements. In particular, when jobs’ durations vastly
differ, these differences must be taken into account when constructing a collective schedule. For
instance, imagine that we are dealing with two jobs—one very short, Js, and one very long, Jl.
Further, imagine that 55% of the population prefers the long job to be executed first and that
the remaining 45% has exactly opposite preferences. If we disregard the jobs’ durations, then
perhaps every decision maker would schedule Jl before Js. However, starting with Js affects 55%
of population just slightly (as Jl is just slightly delayed compared to their preferred schedules). In
contrast, starting with Jl affects 45% of population significantly (as Js is severely delayed).
1.1 Overview of Our Contributions
We explore the following question: How can we meaningfully apply the classic tools from social
choice theory to find a collective schedule? The key idea behind this work is to use fundamental
concepts from both fields to highlight the new perspectives.
Scheduling offers an impressive collection of models, tools and algorithms which can be applied
to a broad class of problems. It is impossible to cover all of them in a single work. We use perhaps
the most fundamental (although still non-trivial) scheduling model: a single processor executing
a set of independent jobs. This model is already rich enough to describe significant real-world
problems (such as the public works or the lecture theater introduced earlier). At the same time,
such a model, fundamental, well-studied and stripped from orthogonal issues, enables us to highlight
the new elements brought by social choice.
Similarly, we focus on three well-known and extensively studied tools from social choice theory:
positional scoring rules, the Kemeny rule and the Condorcet principle. Under a positional scoring
rule the score that an object receives from an agent is derived only on the basis of the position of
this object in the agent’s preference ranking; the objects are then ranked in the descending order
of their total scores received from all the agents. The Kemeny rule uses the concept of distances
between rankings. It selects a ranking which minimizes the sum of the swap distances to the
preference rankings of all the agents. The Condorcet principle states that if there exists an object
that is preferred to any other object by the majority of agents, then this object should be put on
the top of the aggregated ranking. The Condorcet principle can be generalized to the remaining
ranking positions. Assume that the graph of the preferences of the majority of agents is acyclic, i.e.,
there exists no such a sequence of objects o1, . . . , o` that o1 is preferred by the majority of agents
to o2, o2 to o3, . . ., o`−1 to o` and o` to o1. Whenever an object o is preferred by the majority of
agents to another object q, o should be put before q in the aggregated ranking.
Naturally, these three notions can be directly applied to find a collective schedule. Yet, as we
argued in our example with a long and a short job, this can lead to intuitively suboptimal schedules,
because they do not consider significantly different processing times. We propose extensions of these
tools to take into account lengths of the jobs. We also analyze their computational complexity.
1.2 Related Work
Scheduling: The two most related scheduling models apply concepts from game theory and mul-
tiagent optimization. The selfish job model [18, 27] assumes that each job has a single owner trying
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to minimize its completion time and that the jobs compete for processors. The multi-organizational
model [11] assumes that a single organization owns and cares about multiple jobs. Our work com-
plements these with a third perspective: not only each job has multiple “owners”, but also they
care about all jobs (albeit to a different degree).
In multiagent scheduling [2], agents have different optimization goals (e.g., different functions or
weights). The system’s objective is to find all Pareto-optimal schedules, or a single Pareto-optimal
schedule (optimizing one agent’s goal with constraints on admissible values for other goals). In
contrast, our aim is to propose rules allowing to construct a single, compromise schedule. This
compromise stems from social choice methods and tools. Moreover, our setting is motivated by
problems in which the number of agents is large. To the best of our knowledge, the existing
literature on multiagent scheduling focuses on cases with a few (e.g. two) agents.
Computational social choice: For an overview of tools and methods for aggregating agents’
preferences see the book of Arrow et al. [3]. Fischer et al. [15] overview the computational com-
plexity of finding Kemeny rankings. Caragiannis et al. [7] discuss computational complexity of
finding winners according to a number of Condorcet-consistent methods.
Typically in social choice, an aggregated ranking is created to establish the collective preference
relation, and to eventually select a single best alternative (sometimes with a few runner-ups).
Thus, the agents usually do not care what is the order of the candidates in the further part of
the collective ranking. In our model the agents are interested in the whole output rankings. We
can thus implement fairness—the agents who are dissatisfied with an order in the beginning of a
collective schedule might be compensated in the further part of the schedule. Thus, our approach
is closer to the recent works of Skowron et al. [26] and Celis et al. [8] analyzing fairness of collective
rankings.
In participatory budgeting [6, 16, 24, 13, 4] agents express preferences over projects which have
different costs. The goal is to choose a socially-optimal set of items with a total cost not exceeding
the budget. Thus, in a way, participatory budgeting extends the knapsack problem similarly to
how we extend scheduling.
2 The Collective Scheduling Model
We use standard scheduling notations and definitions from the book of Brucker [5], unless otherwise
stated. For each integer t, by [t] we denote the set {1, . . . , t}. Let N = [n] be the set of n agents
(voters) and let J = {J1, . . . , Jm} be the set of m jobs (note that in scheduling m is typically
used to denote the number of machines; we deliberately abuse this notation as our results are for
a single machine). For a job Ji by pi ∈ N we denote its processing time (also called duration or
size), i.e., the number of time units Ji requires to be completed. We consider an off-line problem,
i.e., jobs J are known in advance. Jobs are ready to be processed (there are no release dates). For
each job Ji its processing time pi is known in advance (clairvoyance, a standard assumption in the
scheduling theory). Once started, a job cannot be interrupted until it completes (we do not allow
for preemption of the jobs).
There is a single machine that executes all the jobs. A schedule σ : J → N is a function that
assigns to each job Ji its start time σ(Ji), such that no two jobs Jk, J` execute simultaneously.
Thus, either σ(Jk) ≥ σ(J`) + p` or σ(J`) ≥ σ(Jk) + pk. By Ci(σ) we denote the completion time of
job Ji: Ci(σ) = σ(Ji) + pi. We assume that a schedule has no gaps: for each job i, except the job
that completes as the last one, there exists job j such that Ci(σ) = σ(Jj). Let S denote the set of
all possible schedules for the set of jobs J .
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Each agent wants all jobs to be completed as soon as possible, yet agents differ in their views on
the relative importance of the jobs. We assume that each agent a has a certain preferred schedule
σa ∈ J , and when building σa, an agent is aware of the processing times of the jobs. In particular,
σa does not have to directly correspond to the relative importance of jobs. For instance, if in σa a
short job Js precedes a long job J`, then this does not necessarily mean that a considers Js more
important than J`. a might consider J` more important, but she might prefer a marginally less
important job Js to be completed sooner as it would delay J` only a bit.
A schedule can be encoded as a (transitive, asymmetric) binary relation: Ji σa Jk ⇔ σa(Ji) <
σa(Jk). E.g., J1 σa J2 σa . . . σa Jm means that agent a wants J1 to be processed first, J2 second,
and so on. We will denote such a schedule as (J1, J2, . . . , Jm).
We call a vector of preferred schedules, one for each agent, a preference profile. ByP we denote
the set of all preference profiles of the agents. A scheduling rule R : P → S is a function which
takes a preference profile as an input and returns a collective schedule.
In the remaining part of this section we propose different methods in which the preference profile
is used to evaluate a proposed collective schedule σ (and thus, to construct a scheduling rule R).
All the proposed methods extrapolate information from σa (a preferred schedule) to evaluate σ.
Such an extrapolation is common in social choice: in participatory budgeting it is typical to ask
each agent to provide a single set of items [6, 16, 24, 4] (instead of preferences over sets of items);
similarly in multiwinner elections, each agent provides separable preferences of candidates [25, 14].
Alternatively, we could ask an agent to express her preferences over all possible schedules. This
approach is also common in other areas of social choice (e.g., in voting in combinatorial domains
model [19]), yet it requires eliciting exponential information from the agents. There exist also
middle ground approaches, using specifically designed languages, such as CP-nets, for expressing
preferences.
2.1 Scheduling by Positional Scoring Rules
In the classic social choice, positional scoring rules are perhaps the most straightforward, and
the most commonly used in practice, tools to aggregate agents’ preferences. Informally, under a
positional scoring rule each agent a assigns a score to each candidate c (a job, in our case), which
depends only on the position of c in a’s preference ranking. For each candidate the scores that she
receives from all the agents are summed up, and the candidates are ranked in the descending order
of their total scores.
There is a natural way to adapt this concept. For an increasing function h : N→ R and a job J
we define the h-score of J as the total duration of jobs scheduled after J in all preferred schedules:
h-score(J) =
∑
a∈N
f
 ∑
Ji : J σa Ji
pi
 .
The h-psf-rule (psf for positional scoring function) schedules the jobs by their descending h-
scores. If jobs are unit-size (pi = 1), then h-score(J) is simply the score that J would get from the
classic positional scoring rule induced by h. For an identity function hid(x) = x, the hid-psf-rule
corresponds to the Borda voting method adapted to collective scheduling.
The so-defined scheduling methods differ from traditional positional scoring rules, by taking
into account the processing times of the jobs:
1. A score that a job J receives from an agent a depends on the total processing time rather than
on the number of jobs that J precedes in schedule σa.
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2. When scoring a job J we sum the duration of jobs scheduled after J , rather than before it. This
implicitly favors jobs with lower processing times. Indeed, consider two preferred schedules, σ
and τ identical until time t, at which a long job J` is scheduled in σ, and a short job Js is
scheduled in τ . Since Js is shorter, the total size of the jobs succeeding Js in τ is larger than
the total size of the jobs succeeding J` in σ. Consequently, Js gets a higher score from τ than
J` gets from σ.
However, this implicit preference for short jobs seems insufficient, as illustrated by the following
example.
Example 1. Consider three jobs, J`,1, J`,2, Js, with the processing times `, `, and 1, respectively.
Assume that ` 1, and consider the following preferred schedules of agents:
3n/8 +  of agents : J`,1 σ J`,2 σ Js
3n/8 +  of agents : J`,2 σ J`,1 σ Js
n/8−  of agents : Js σ J`,1 σ J`,2
n/8−  of agents : Js σ J`,2 σ J`,1
By hid-psf-rule, J`,1 and J`,2 are scheduled before Js. However, starting with Js would delay J`,1
and J`,2 by only one time unit, while starting with J`,1 and J`,2 delays Js by 2`, an arbitrarily large
value. Moreover, Js is put first by roughly 1/4 of agents, a significant fraction.
Example 1 demonstrates that the pure social choice theory does not offer tools appropriate
for collective scheduling (we will provide more arguments to support this statement throughout
the text). To address such issues we propose an approach that builds upon social choice and the
scheduling theory.
2.2 Scheduling Based on Cost Functions
A cost function quantifies how a given schedule τ differs from an agent’s preferred schedule σ. In
this section, we adapt to our model classic costs used in scheduling and in social choice. We then
show how to aggregate these costs among agents in order to produce a single measure of a quality
of a schedule. This approach allows us to construct a family of scheduling methods that, in some
sense, extend the classic Kemeny rule.
Formally, a cost function f maps a pair of schedules, τ and σ, to a non-negative real value. We
analyze the following cost functions. Below, τ denotes a collective schedule the quality of which we
want to assess; while σ denotes the preferred schedule of a single agent.
2.2.1 Swap Costs.
These functions take into account only the orders of jobs in the two schedules (ignoring the pro-
cessing times), thus directly correspond to costs from social choice.
1. The Kendall [17] tau (or swap) distance (K), measures the number of swaps of adjacent jobs to
turn one schedule into another one. We use an equivalent definition that counts all pairs of jobs
executed in a non-preferred order:
K(τ, σ) =
∣∣∣{(k, `) : Jk τ J` and J` σ Jk}∣∣∣.
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2. Spearman distance (S). Let pos(J, pi) denote the position of job J in a schedule pi, i.e., the
number of jobs scheduled before J in pi. The Spearman distance is defined as:
S(τ, σ) =
∑
J∈J
∣∣pos(J, σ)− pos(J, τ)∣∣.
2.2.2 Delay Costs.
These functions use the completion times {Ci(σ) : Ji ∈ J } of jobs in the preferred schedule σ (and
thus, indirectly, jobs’ lengths). The completion times form jobs’ due dates, di = Ci(σ). A delay
cost then quantifies how far are the proposed completion times {ci = Ci(τ) : Ji ∈ J } from their
due dates {di} by one of the six classic criteria defined in Brucker [5]:
Tardiness (T) T (ci, di) = max(0, ci − di).
Unit penalties (U) how many jobs are late:
U(ci, di) =
{
1 if ci > di
0 otherwise.
Lateness (L) is similar to tardiness, but includes a bonus for being early: L(ci, di) = ci − di.
Earliness (E) E(ci, di) = max(0, di − ci).
Absolute deviation (D) D(ci, di) = |ci − di|.
Squared deviation (SD) SD(ci, di) = (ci − di)2.
Each such a criterion f ∈ {T,U, L,E,D,SD} naturally induces the corresponding delay cost of
an agent, f(τ, σ):
f(τ, σ) =
∑
Ji∈J
f
(
Ci(τ), Ci(σ)
)
.
In this work, we mostly focus on the tardiness T , which is both easy to interpret for our
motivating examples and the most extensively studied in scheduling. However, there is interest to
study the remaining functions as well. U and L are similar to T—the sooner a task is completed, the
better. The remaining three measures (E,S, and SD) penalize the jobs which are executed before
their “preferred times”. However, each job when executed earlier makes other jobs executed later
(e.g., after their due times). Thus, these penalties quantify the unnecessary (wasted) promotion of
jobs executed too early (causing other jobs being executed too late).1
By restricting the instances to unit-size jobs, we can relate delay and swap costs. The Spearman
distance S has the same value as the absolute deviation D (by definition), and twice that of T :
Proposition 1. For unit-size jobs it holds that S(σ, τ) = 2T (σ, τ), for all schedules σ, τ .
1The considered metrics have their natural interpretations also in other more specific settings. E.g., the earliness
E is useful if each task represents a (collective) work to be done by the agents (workers) and when agents do not
want to work before their preferred start times. Similarly, D and SD can be used when an agent wants each task to
be executed exactly at the preferred time.
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Proof. Observe that for unit-size jobs the tardiness measure can be expressed as:
T (τ, σ) =
∑
J : pos(J,τ)>pos(J,σ)
(
pos(J, τ)− pos(J, σ)
)
,
Since
∑
J pos(J, τ) =
∑
J pos(J, σ) we get that:
0 =
∑
J
(
pos(J, τ)− pos(J, σ)
)
=
∑
J : pos(J,τ)>pos(J,σ)
(
pos(J, τ)− pos(J, σ)
)
+
∑
J : pos(J,τ)<pos(J,σ)
(
pos(J, τ)− pos(J, σ)
)
+
+
∑
J : pos(J,τ)=pos(J,σ)
(
pos(J, τ)− pos(J, σ)
)
=
∑
J : pos(J,τ)>pos(J,σ)
(
pos(J, τ)− pos(J, σ)
)
+
∑
J : pos(J,τ)<pos(J,σ)
(
pos(J, τ)− pos(J, σ)
)
.
Thus: ∑
J : pos(J,τ)>pos(J,σ)
∣∣∣pos(J, τ)− pos(J, σ)∣∣∣ = ∑
J : pos(J,τ)<pos(J,σ)
∣∣∣pos(J, τ)− pos(J, σ)∣∣∣.
And, consequently:
S(τ, σ) =
∑
J
∣∣∣pos(J, τ)− pos(J, σ)∣∣∣
=
∑
J : pos(J,τ)>pos(J,σ)
(
pos(J, τ)− pos(J, σ)
)
+
+
∑
J : pos(J,τ)<pos(J,σ)
(
pos(J, τ)− pos(J, σ)
)
= 2
∑
J : pos(J,τ)>pos(J,σ)
(
pos(J, τ)− pos(J, σ)
)
= 2T (τ, σ).
This completes the proof.
Since different agents can have different preferred schedules, in order to score a proposed sched-
ule τ we need to aggregate the costs across all agents. We will consider three classic aggregations:
The sum (Σ):
∑
a∈N f(τ, σa), a utilitarian aggregation.
The max: maxa∈N f(τ, σa), an egalitarian aggregation.
The Lp norm (Lp):
p
√∑
a∈N
(
f(τ, σa)
)p
, with a parameter p ≥ 1. The Lp norms form a spec-
trum of aggregations between the sum (L1) and the max (L∞).
For a cost function f ∈ {K,S, T, U, L,E,D,SD} and an aggregation α ∈ {Σ,max, Lp}, by α-f
we denote a scheduling rule returning a schedule that minimizes the α-aggregation of the f -costs
of the agents. In particular, for unit-size jobs the Σ-T rule is equivalent to Σ-S and to Σ-D, and
Σ-K is simply the Kemeny rule.
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Scheduling based on cost functions avoids the problems exposed by Example 1 (indeed for that
instance, e.g., the Σ-T rule starts with the short job Js). Additionally, these methods satisfy some
naturally-appealing axiomatic properties, such as reinforcement, which is a particularly natural
requirement in our case.
Definition 1 (Reinforcement). A scheduling rule R satisfies reinforcement iff for any two groups
of agents N1 and N2, a schedule σ is selected by R both for N1 and for N2, then it should be also
selected for the joint instance N1 ∪N2.
Proposition 2. All Σ-f scheduling rules satisfy reinforcement.
2.3 Beyond Positional Scoring Rules and Cost Functions: the Condorcet Prin-
ciple
In the previous section we introduced several scheduling rules, all based on the notion of a distance
between schedules. Thus, these scheduling rules are closely related to the Kemeny voting system.
We now take a different approach. We start from desired properties of a collective schedule and
design scheduling rules satisfying them.
Pareto efficiency is one of the most accepted axioms in social choice theory. Below we use a
formulation analogous to the one used in voting theory (based on swaps in preferred schedules).
Definition 2 (Pareto efficiency). A scheduling rule R satisfies Pareto efficiency iff for each pair
of jobs, Jk and J`, and for each preference profile σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) ∈P such that for each a ∈ N
we have Jk σa J`, it holds that Jk R(σ) J`.
In other words, if all agents prefer Jk to be scheduled before J`, then in the collective schedule
Jk should be before J`. Curiously, the total tardiness Σ-T rule does not satisfy Pareto efficiency:
Example 2. Consider an instance with 3 jobs J1, J2, J3 with lengths 20, 5, and 1, respectively, and
with two agents having preferred schedules σa = (J1, J3, J2) and σb = (J2, J1, J3). Both agents prefer
J1 to be scheduled before J3. If our scheduling rule satisfied Pareto efficiency, then it would pick
one of the following three schedules: (J1, J3, J2), (J1, J2, J3), or (J2, J1, J3). The total tardinesses
of these schedules are equal to: 21, 25, and 10, respectively. Yet, the total tardiness of the schedule
(J2, J3, J1) is equal to 7.
This example can be generalized to inapproximability:
Proposition 3. For any α > 1, there is no scheduling rule that satisfies Pareto efficiency and is
α-approximate for max-T or Σ-T .
Proof. Let us assume, towards a contradiction, that there exists a scheduling rule R that satisfies
Pareto efficiency and is α-approximate for minimizing Σ-T (the proof for max-T is analogous).
Let x = d3αe. Consider an instance with x + 2 jobs: one job J1 of length x2, one job J2 of
length x, and x jobs J3, . . . , Jx+2 of length 1. Let us consider two agents with preferred schedules
σ1 = (J1, J3, . . . , Jx+2, J2) and σ2 = (J2, J1, J3, . . . , Jx+2). For each i ∈ {3, . . . , x+ 2}, both agents
prefer job J1 to be scheduled before job Ji. Let τ be the schedule returned by R. Since R satisfies
Pareto efficiency, for each i ∈ {3, . . . , x+2}, J1 is scheduled before job Ji in τ . Thus τ is either σ2 ,
or a schedule where J1 is scheduled first, followed by i jobs of length 1 (i ∈ {0, . . . , x}), followed by
J2, followed by the x− i remaining jobs of length 1. Let Si be such a schedule. In Si, the tardiness
of job J2 is x
2 + i (this job is in first position in σ2), and the tardiness of the jobs of length 1 is
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(x − i)x (the x − i last jobs in Si are scheduled before J2 in σ1). Thus the total tardiness of Si
is (x2 + i) + (x − i)x ≥ x2 + x. The total tardiness of schedule σ2 is x2 + x (each of the x jobs
J1, J3, . . . , Jx+2 in σ2 finishes x time units later than in σ1). Thus, the total tardiness of τ is at
least x2 +x. Let us now consider schedule τ ′, which does not satisfy Pareto efficiency, and which is
as follows: job J2 is scheduled first, followed by the jobs of length 1, followed by job J1. The total
tardiness of this schedule is 3x (the only job which is delayed compared to σ1 and σ2 is job J1).
This schedule is optimal for Σ-T . Thus the approximation ratio of R is at least x2+x3x = x+13 > α.
Therefore, R is not α-approximate for Σ-T , a contradiction.
Proposition 4. If all jobs are unit-size, the scheduling rule
∑
-T is Pareto efficient.
Proof. Let us assume that there exist two jobs which are not in a Pareto order in the schedule σ
optimizing
∑
T . We can swap these jobs in σ and it is apparent that such a swap does not increase
the total tardiness of the schedule. We can perform such swaps until we reach a schedule which
does not violate Pareto efficiency.
Pareto efficiency is one of the most fundamental properties in social choice. However, sometimes
(especially in our setting) there exist reasons for violating it. For instance, even if all the agents
agree that Jx should be scheduled before Jy, the preferences of the agents with respect to other
jobs might differ. Breaking Pareto efficiency can help to achieve a compromise with respect to
these other jobs.
Nevertheless, Proposition 3 motivated us to formulate alternative scheduling rules based on
axiomatic properties. We choose the Condorcet principle, a classic social choice property that is
stronger than Pareto efficiency. We adapt it to consider the durations of jobs.
Definition 3 (Processing Time Aware (PTA) Condorcet principle). A schedule τ ∈ S is PTA
Condorcet consistent with a preference profile σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) ∈P if for each two jobs, Jk and J`,
it holds that Jk τ J` whenever at least
pk
pk+p`
· n agents put Jk before J` in their preferred schedule.
A scheduling rule R satisfies the PTA Condorcet principle if for each preference profile it returns
a PTA Condorcet consistent schedule, whenever such exists.
Let us explain our motivation for ratio pkpk+p` . Consider a schedule τ and two jobs, Jk and J`,
scheduled consecutively in τ . By Nk we denote the set of agents who rank Jk before J` in their
preferred schedules, and let us assume that |Nk| > pkpk+p`n; we set N` = N − Nk. Observe that if
we swapped Jk and J` in τ , then each agent from Nk would be disappointed. Since such a swap
makes Jk scheduled p` time units later than in τ , the level of dissatisfaction of each agent from Nk
could be quantified by p`. Thus, their total (utilitarian) dissatisfaction dis(Nk) could be quantified
by |Nk| · p`. By an analogous argument, if we started with a schedule where J` is put right before
Jk, and swapped these jobs, then the total dissatisfaction of agents from N` could be quantified by:
dis(N`) = |N`|pk <
(
n− pk
pk + p`
n
)
pk
= n · pkp`
pk + p`
< |Nk| · p` = dis(Nk).
Thus, the total dissatisfaction of all agents from scheduling Jk before J` is smaller than that from
scheduling J` before Jk. Definition 3 requires that in such case Jk should be indeed scheduled
before J`.
Proposition 5 below highlights the difference between scheduling based on the tardiness and on
the PTA Condorcet principle.
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Proposition 5. Even if all jobs are unit-size, the
∑
-T rule does not satisfy the PTA Condorcet
principle.
Proof. Consider an instance with three jobs and three agents with the following preferred schedules:
σ1 = (J1, J2, J3); σ2 = (J1, J3, J2); σ3 = (J1, J3, J2);
σ4 = (J2, J3, J1); σ5 = (J2, J3, J1).
The only PTA Condorcet consistent schedule is (J1, J2, J3) with the total tardiness of 6. At the
same time, the schedule (J1, J3, J2) has the total tardiness equal to 5.
To construct a PTA Condorcet consistent schedule, we propose to extend Condorcet consis-
tent [9, 20] election rules to jobs with varying lengths. For example, we obtain:
PTA Copeland’s method. For each job Jk we define the score of Jk as the number of jobs J`
such that at least pkpk+p` · n agents put Jk before J` in their preferred schedule. The jobs are
scheduled in the descending order of their scores.
Iterative PTA Minimax. For each pair of jobs, Jk and J`, we define the defeat score of Jk
against J` as max(0,
pk
pk+p`
n − nk), where nk is the number of agents who put Jk before J` in
their preferred schedule. We define the defeat score of Jk as the highest defeat score of Jk
against any other job. The job with the lowest defeat score is scheduled first. Next, we remove
this job from the preferences of the agents, and repeat (until there are no jobs left).
Other Condorcet consistent election rules, such as the Dogdson’s rule or the Tideman’s ranked pairs
method, can be adapted similarly. It is apparent that they satisfy the PTA Condorcet principle.
PTA Condorcet consistency comes at a cost: e.g., the two scheduling rules violate reinforcement,
even if the jobs are unit-size. Indeed, by the classic result of Young and Levenglick [28] one can
infer that any rule that satisfies PTA-Condorcet principle, neutrality, and reinforcement must be
a generalization of the Kemeny rule (i.e., must be equivalent to the Kemeny rule if the processing
times of the jobs are equal). We conjecture that rules satisfying neutrality and reinforcement fail the
PTA-Condorcet principle; it is an interesting open question whether such an impossibility theorem
holds.
3 Computational Results
In this section we study the computational complexity of finding collective schedules according to
the previously defined rules. We start from the simple observation about the two PTA Condorcet
consistent rules that we defined in the previous section.
Proposition 6. The PTA Copeland’s method and the iterative PTA minimax rule are computable
in polynomial time.
We further observe that computational complexity of the rules which ignore the lengths of the
jobs (rules based on swap costs) can be directly inferred from the known results from computational
social choice. For instance, the Σ-K rule is simply the well-known and extensively studied Kemeny
rule. Thus, in the further part of this section we focus on the rules based on delay costs.
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3.1 Sum of Delay Costs
First, observe that the problem of finding a collective schedule is computationally easy for the total
lateness (Σ-L). In fact, Σ-L ignores the preferred schedules of the agents and arranges the jobs
from the shortest to the longest one.
Proposition 7. The rule Σ-L schedules the jobs in the ascending order of their lengths.
Proof. Consider the total cost of the agents:∑
a∈N
L(τ, σa) =
∑
a∈N
∑
Ji∈J
(Ci(τ)− Ci(σa)) = |N |
∑
Ji∈J
Ci(τ)−
∑
a∈N
∑
Ji∈J
Ci(σa).
Thus, the total cost of the agents is minimized when
∑
Ji∈J Ci(τ) is minimal. This value is minimal
when the jobs are scheduled from the shortest to the longest one.
On the other hand, minimizing the total tardiness Σ-T is NP-hard even with the unary repre-
sentation of the durations of jobs. Du and Leung [10] show that minimizing total tardiness with
arbitrary due dates on a single processor (1||∑Ti) is weakly NP-hard. We cannot use this result
directly as the due dates in our problem Σ-T are structured and depend, among others, on jobs’
durations.
Theorem 8. The problem of finding a collective schedule minimizing the total tardiness (Σ-T ) is
strongly NP-hard.
Proof. We reduce from the strongly NP-hard 3-Partition problem. Let I be an instance of 3-
Partition. In I we are given a multiset of integers S = {s1, . . . , s3µ}. We denote sΣ =
∑
s∈S s.
We ask if S can be partitioned into µ triples that all have the same sum, sT = sΣ/µ. Without
loss of generality, we can assume that µ ≥ 2 and that for each s ∈ S, µ < s < sT2 (otherwise, we
can add a large constant sΣ to each integer from S, which does not change the optimal solution of
the instance, but which ensures that µ < s < sT2 in the new instance). We also assume that the
integers from S are represented in unary encoding.
From I we construct an instance I ′ of the problem of finding a collective schedule that minimizes
the total tardiness in the following way. For each number s ∈ S we introduce 1 + sµ jobs: Js and{
Ps,i,j : i ∈ [s], j ∈ [µ]
}
. We set the processing time of Js to s. Further, for each i ∈ [s] we set the
processing time of Ps,i,1 to (sT − s), and of the remaining j ≥ 2 jobs Ps,i,j to sT . We denote the set
of all such jobs as JS = {Js : s ∈ S} and P =
{
Ps,i,j : s, i ∈ [s], j ∈ [µ]
}
. Additionally, we introduce
µ jobs, X = {X1, . . . , Xµ}, each having a unit processing time.
There are sΣ agents. For each integer s ∈ S we introduce s agents. The i-th agent corresponding
to number s, denoted by as,i, has the following preferred schedule (in the notation below a set, e.g.,
{Js′} denotes that its elements are scheduled in a fixed arbitrary order):(
Js, Ps,i,1, X1, Ps,i,2, X2, . . . , Ps,i,µ, Xµ, {Js′ : s′ 6= s},
{
Ps′,j,` : (s
′ 6= s or j 6= i) and ` ∈ [µ]}).
We claim that the answer to the initial instance I is “yes” if and only if the schedule σ∗
optimizing the total tardiness is the following one:
(
J1, X1,J2, X2,Jµ, Xµ,P
)
, where for each
i ∈ [µ], Ji is a set consisting of jobs from JS with lengths summing up to sT (see Figure 1). If such
a schedule exists, then the answer to I is “yes”. Below we will prove the other implication.
Observe that any job from JS should be scheduled before each job from P. Indeed, for each
pair Ps,i,j and Js′ only a single agent a = as,i ranks Ps,i,j before Js′ ; at the same time there exists
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Figure 1: The preferred schedule σ(s,i) of agent as,i (top) and the optimal schedule (bottom).
another agent a′ = as′,k who ranks Js′ first. As Js′ is shorter than Ps,i,j , a′ gains more from Js′
scheduled before Ps,i,j , than a gains from Ps,i,j scheduled before Js′ . Thus, if Ps,i,j were scheduled
before Js′ , we could swap these two jobs and improve the schedule (such a swap could only improve
the completion times of other jobs since Js′ is shorter than Ps,i,j).
By a similar argument, any job from X should be scheduled before each job from P. Indeed, if
it was not the case, then there would exist jobs P = Ps,i,j and X = Xi′ such that P is scheduled
right before X (this follows from the reasoning given in the previous paragraph—a job from JS
cannot be scheduled after a job from P). Also, since all the jobs from JS are scheduled before P ,
the completion time of X would be at least sΣ +
sT
2 +1 ≥ sΣ +µ+2. For each agent, the completion
time of X in their preferred schedule is at most equal to µ(sT + 1) = sΣ + µ. Thus, if we swap
X and P the improvement of the tardiness due to scheduling X earlier would be at least equal to
2sΣ. Such a swap increases the completion time of P only by one, so the increase of the tardiness
due to scheduling P later would be at most equal to sΣ. Consequently, a swap would decrease the
total tardiness, and so X could have not been scheduled after P in σ∗.
We further investigate the structure of an optimal schedule σ∗. We know that JS σ∗ P and
that X σ∗ P, but we do not yet know the optimal order of jobs from JS ∪ X . Before proceeding
further, we introduce one useful class of schedules, T , that execute jobs in the order (JS ,X ,P).
Observe that σ∗ can be constructed starting from some schedule τ ∈ T and performing a sequence
of swaps, each swap involving a job J ∈ JS and a job X ∈ X . The tardiness of σ∗ is equal to the
tardiness of the initial τ adjusted by the changes due to the swaps. Below, we further analyze T .
First, any ordering of JS in τ results in the same tardiness. Indeed, consider two jobs Js and Js′
such that Js′ is scheduled right after Js. If we swap Js and Js′ , then the total tardiness of s agents
increases by s′ and the total tardiness of s′ agents decreases by s. In effect, the total tardiness of
all agents remains unchanged. Second, there exists an optimal schedule where the relative order of
the jobs from X is X1 σ∗X2 σ∗ . . . σ∗Xµ. Thus, w.l.o.g., we constrain T to schedules in which X
are put in exactly this order.
Since we have shown that all T always have the same tardiness, no matter how we arrange the
jobs from JS , the tardiness of σ∗ only depends on the change of the tardiness due to the swaps.
Consider the job X1, and consider what happens if we swap X1 with a number of jobs from JS
so that eventually X1 is scheduled at time sT (its start time in all preferred schedules). In such
a case, moving X1 forward decreases the tardiness of each of sΣ agents by (sΣ − sT ). Moving X1
forward to sT requires however delaying some jobs from JS . Assume that the jobs from JS with the
processing times si1 , . . . si` are delayed. Each such job needs to be scheduled one time unit later.
Thus, the total tardiness of si1 agents increases by 1 (the agents who had this job as the first in
their preferred schedule), of other si2 agents increases by 1, and so on. Since si1 +. . .+si` = sΣ−sT ,
the total tardiness of all agents increases by sΣ − sT . Thus, in total, executing X1 at sT decreases
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the total tardiness by sΣ(sΣ − sT ) − (sΣ − sT ), a positive number. Also, observe that this value
does not depend on how the jobs from JS were initially arranged, provided that X1 can be put so
that it starts at sT .
Starting X1 earlier than sT does not improve the tardiness of X1, yet it increases tardiness
of some other jobs, so it is suboptimal. By repeating the same reasoning for X2, . . . , Xµ we infer
that we obtain the optimal decrease of the tardiness when X1 is scheduled at time sT , X2 at time
2sT + 1, etc., and if there are no gaps between the jobs. However, such schedule is possible to
obtain if and only if the answer to the initial instance of 3-Partition is “yes”.
A similar strategy (yet, with a more complex construction) can be used to prove the NP-hardness
of Σ-U .
Theorem 9. The problem of finding a collective schedule minimizing the total number of late jobs
(Σ-U) is strongly NP-hard.
Proof. We give a reduction from the strongly NP-hard 3-Partition problem. Let I be an instance
of 3-Partition. In I we are given a multiset of 3µ integers S = {s1, . . . , s3µ}. Similarly, as in the
proof of Theorem 8, we set sΣ =
∑
s∈S s. In I we ask if S can be partitioned into µ triples that all
have the same sum, sT = sΣ/µ. We assume that for each s ∈ S, s < sT2 , that µ > 4, and that the
integers from S are represented in unary encoding.
From I we construct an instance I ′ of the problem of finding a collective schedule that minimizes
the total number of late jobs in the following way. For each number s ∈ S we introduce the following
jobs:
• a job Fs of length s;
• sµ jobs of length sT − s; we denote this set as:
Rs =
{
Rs,i,j : s, i ∈ [s]j ∈ [µ]
}
;
• µ(µ− 1)s jobs of length sT ; we denote this set as:
Ps =
{
Ps,i,j,k : s, i ∈ [s], j ∈ [µ], k ∈ [µ− 1]
}
.
Let J be the set of all the jobs. Further, we set:
F = {Fs : s ∈ S}; R =
⋃
s∈S
Rs; P =
⋃
s∈S
Ps;
Additionally, we introduce µ jobs, X = {X1, . . . , Xµ}, each having a unit length, and a job L
of length 3sµ3sT (thus, the length of L is larger than the length of all the jobs of J \ {L}).
There are µsΣ agents in total. For each number s ∈ S we introduce sµ agents. Let As be the
set of these agents. We partition As into µ sets of s agents: As,1, . . . ,As,µ. Figure 2 represents the
preferred schedule of the j-th agent from As,i (i ∈ [µ], j ∈ [s]). For all the agents, job Xi (i ∈ [µ])
starts at time isT + i − 1, and job L starts at time D = sΣ + µ = µ(sT + 1). Further, for all the
agents of As,i, job Fs starts at time isT + (i − 1) − s (i.e., for these agents, Fs is scheduled just
before job Xi). Further, in this schedule job Rs,i,j is put just before job Fs: at time (i− 1)(sT + 1),
and job Ps,i,j,k (k ∈ [µ − 1]) is scheduled at time (k − 1)(sT + 1) if k < i, and at time k(sT + 1)
if k ≥ i. All the other jobs are scheduled after job L, i.e., at soonest at time D + pL. Let us
arbitrarily label the agents from 0 to µsΣ− 1. The jobs of Agent i which are not already scheduled
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Figure 2: Preferred schedule of the j-th agent of As,i.
before D+ pL are scheduled in an arbitrarily order after D+ pL, except that the 2µ− 2 latest jobs
of the schedule are the jobs of P which are scheduled before D in the preferred schedule of Agent
(i+ 1 mod µsΣ), followed by the jobs of P which are scheduled before D in the preferred schedule
of Agent (i+ 2 mod µsΣ). This will ensure that each job of P appears only twice in the (2µ− 2)
last jobs of the agents (since, for each job of P, only one agent schedules it before D).
We will now show that the answer to the 3-partition problem on instance I is “yes” if and only
if the optimal schedule for Σ-U on I ′ starts as follows:
(
F1, X1,F2, X2,Fµ, Xµ
)
, where each set Fi
consists of jobs from F with lengths summing up to sT .
If the schedule for Σ-U on I ′ starts as follows:
(
F1, X1,F2, X2,Fµ, Xµ
)
, where each set Fi
(i ∈ [µ]) consists of jobs from F with lengths summing up to sT , then the solution of 3-partition is
“yes” since each job of F has the length of a number of S. Let us now assume that the solution of
3-partition on Instance I is “yes”. We will show that the optimal solution of Σ-U on Instance I ′
indeed starts with:
(
F1, X1,F2, X2,Fµ, Xµ
)
.
Let us consider an optimal schedule σ∗ for I ′. First, we will show that in σ∗, each job Xi
(i ∈ [µ]) is scheduled at latest at time isT + (i− 1).
Indeed, in the preferred schedules of all the agents, Xi is completed at time isT + (i− 1). If in
σ∗, Xi would not be completed at latest at time isT + (i − 1), then it would mean that another
job T ∈ (J − X ) is scheduled before Xi. In this case, swapping T and Xi would not increase the
number of late jobs. This is the case because scheduling Xi before isT + (i− 1) decreases by µsΣ
(this is the number of agents) the number of late jobs, and the length of Xi is smaller than the one
of T so the swap of Xi and T will not delay jobs other than T .
Second, we will show that in σ∗, job L is scheduled in the last position. For this we consider
two cases:
1. Let us first consider what happens if this job is not late, i.e., if it is scheduled in σ∗ at latest at
time D. Let us now look at the 2µ − 2 last jobs of σ∗. Each of these jobs is late for at least
µsΣ − 2 agents (all the agents except two), since for each job of P, only two agents have it in
one of their 2µ−2 last positions of their preferred schedule (and all these jobs are of length sT ).
Thus the total number of late jobs is at least (µsΣ − 2)(2µ− 2).
2. Let us now consider the case where job L is late in σ∗: it is scheduled after time D. In this case,
it will be late for all the agents, so we can assume that it is scheduled in the last position of σ∗.
Thus, all the jobs of J \{L} are scheduled before D+pL in σ∗ (this is true since the length of L
is larger that the total length of the jobs of J \{L}). Since each job of P ∪R appears only once
before D+ pL in the preferred schedules of the agents, each job of P ∪R will be late for at most
one agent: the number of jobs of P ∪ R which will be late is thus at most the number of jobs
of P ∪ R: µ2sΣ. The number of jobs of F which are scheduled before D + pL in the preferred
schedules of the agents is µsΣ (indeed for each s ∈ S, job Fs appears for s agents just before job
Xi, with i ∈ [µ]). Thus, the number of jobs from F which will be late in σ∗ is at most equal to
µsΣ. Job L is late for all the µsΣ agents, and we have already seen that the jobs of X are not
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late in σ∗. Therefore, the total number of jobs which will be late in σ∗ is at most (µ + 2)µsΣ.
This is smaller that the lower bound of the number of jobs late if L is not late in σ∗ (this lower
bound was (µsΣ − 2)(2µ− 2), and we have assumed that µ > 4).
From the case analysis we conclude that in σ∗, L is scheduled in the last position.
Third, we infer that the jobs of P ∪R are scheduled in σ∗ at soonest at time D. If this was not
the case, a job of F would be scheduled after time D. We argue that by swapping this job with a
job of P ∪R scheduled before D we would not increase the number of late jobs. Indeed, if a job of
P ∪ R is completed at latest at time D then it will be, in the best case, scheduled on time for all
the agents, whereas if it is completed after time D (but before D+pL) it will be late for (only) one
agent. Moving forward a job Fs ∈ F which is completed after time D so that it is now completed
at latest at time D − 1 (Fs is shorter that any job of P ∪R) will decrease the number of late jobs
by at least s ≥ 1 since s agents have this job completed at time D− 1 in their preferred schedules.
Since Fs is shorter than any job of P ∪ R, then doing such a swap does not make any other job
late.
We have seen that in σ∗, the jobs scheduled before D are the jobs of X ∪ F , and that the jobs
of X are not late (i.e. Xi is scheduled at latest at time isT + i− 1). Let us now see how these jobs
are scheduled.
Recall that for each s ∈ S, job Fs is completed for s agents at time sT , for s agents at time
2sT + 1, and so forth (for each i ∈ [µ] it is completed s times in isT + (i− 1)). Therefore, if, in σ∗,
job Fs is completed at latest at time sT , is will not be late for any agent; if it is completed after sT
but at latest at time 2sT + 1, it will be late for s agents, and so forth. For each i ∈ [µ] we define
Slot i as the time interval [(i − 1)sT + i − 1, isT + i − 1]. As we have seen, if Fs is completed in
Slot i (i ∈ [µ]), it will be late for (i − 1)s agents. Since the length of Fs is s, it means that each
unit of a job F ∈ F such that F is completed in Slot i adds (i − 1) to the number of late jobs.
Let Ui be the sum of the lengths of jobs of F completed in Slot i. The number of late jobs of F is
then
∑µ
i=1 Ui(i− 1). Therefore, to minimize the number of late jobs, U1—the total length of jobs
completed in Slot 1—should be as large as possible, and then, for the remaining jobs, U2 should be
as large as possible, and so forth. Since Xi has to be scheduled at latest at time isT +(i−1), i.e. at
the beginning of Slot i+ 1, the number of late jobs is minimized if Xi is scheduled exactly at time
isT + (i− 1). This can be done only if it is possible to schedule the jobs of F in the slots between
the jobs of X . Since we have assumed that there is a “yes” solution to the 3-partition problem on
instance I, it is possible to partition the jobs of F in triples with lengths summing up to sT . Thus,
each of this triple will correspond to a triple of jobs in the same slot. Hence the optimal solution
of Σ-U starts as follows:
(
F1, X1,F2, X2,Fµ, Xµ
)
, where each set Fi consists of jobs from F with
lengths summing up to sT . This completes the proof.
Nonetheless, if the jobs have the same size, the problem can be solved in polynomial time
(highlighting the additional complexity brought by the main element of the collective scheduling).
Our proof uses the idea of Dwork et al. [12] who proved an analogous result for the Spearman
distance.
Proposition 10. If all jobs have the same size, for each delay cost f ∈ {T,U, L,E,D,SD} rule∑
-f can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. Let us fix f ∈ {T,U, L,E,D,SD}. We reduce the problem of finding a collective schedule
to the assignment problem. Observe that when the jobs have all the same size, say p, then in the
optimal schedule each job should be started at time `p for some ` ∈ {0, . . . ,m − 1}. Thus, we
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construct a bipartite graph where the vertices on one side correspond to m jobs and the vertices on
the other side to m possible starting times of these jobs. The edge between a job J and a starting
time `p has a cost which is equal to the total cost caused by job J being scheduled to start at time
`p. The cost can be computed independently of how the other jobs are scheduled, and is equal to∑
a∈N f(`p+ 1, Ci(σa)
)
. Thus, a schedule that minimizes the total cost corresponds to an optimal
assignment of m jobs to their m slots. Such an assignment can be found in polynomial time, e.g.,
by the Hungarian algorithm.
We conclude this section by observing that hardness of computing
∑
-K and
∑
-S rules can be
deduced from the hardness of computing Kemeny rankings [12].
Proposition 11. Computing
∑
-K and
∑
-S is NP-hard even for n = 4 agents and when all jobs
have the same unit size.
3.2 Lp-norm of Delay Costs, p > 1
We start by observing that the general case is hard even for two agents. The proof of the below
theorem works also for p =∞, i.e., for max-{T,E,D}.
Theorem 12. For each p > 1, finding a schedule returned by Lp-{T,E,D} is NP-hard, even for
two agents.
Proof. Let us fix p > 1. We show a reduction from Partition. In Partition we are given a set of
integers S = {s1, . . . , sn}, si < si+1, and we ask whether S can be partitioned in two sets Sa and
Sb that have the same sum, s = 1/2 ·
∑
si.
We construct an instance of the problem of finding an optimal collective schedule according to
Lp-T as follows (our construction is inspired by Agnetis et al. [1]). For each si ∈ S we introduce
two jobs J
(a)
i and J
(b)
i , both with length p
(a)
i = p
(b)
i = si. We have two agents, a and b. Both agents
prefer a schedule executing jobs in order of their increasing lengths (an SPT schedule). For each
pair of jobs (J
(a)
i , J
(b)
i ) with equal lengths, agent a prefers J
(a)
i to J
(b)
i , while agent b prefers J
(b)
i to
J
(a)
i . Thus, the preferred schedule σa of agent a is (J
(a)
1 , J
(b)
1 , J
(a)
2 , J
(b)
2 , . . . , J
(a)
n , J
(b)
n ); while σb is
(J
(b)
1 , J
(a)
1 , J
(b)
2 , J
(a)
2 , . . . , J
(b)
n , J
(a)
n ). We ask whether there exist a schedule with a cost of
p
√
2sp.
Assume there exists a partition of S into two disjoint sets Sa, Sb where
∑
v∈Sa v =
∑
v ∈ Sbv =
s. We construct an SPT schedule σ = (J
(·)
1 , J
(·)
1 , J
(·)
2 , J
(·)
2 , . . . , J
(·)
n , J
(·)
n ). For each pair of jobs
{J (a)i ), J (b)i )} of equal length, if si ∈ Sa, the jobs are scheduled in order (J (a)i , J (b)i ); otherwise (i.e.,
si ∈ Sb) in order (J (b)i , J (a)i ). For each pair of jobs, the order (J (a)i , J (b)i ) increases agent b’s tardiness
by p
(a)
i = si; while agent a’s tardiness is not increased. Similarly, the order (J
(b)
i , J
(a)
i ) increases
agent a’s tardiness by p
(b)
i = si. Consequently, T (σ, σa) = Sb = s and T (σ, σb) = Sa = s, and thus
the total cost is p
√
2sp.
Assume there is a schedule σ with the total cost of p
√
2sp. We first show it has to be an SPT
schedule. For the sake of contradiction, assume that a non-SPT schedule σ′ has the minimal cost.
Pick two jobs Ji, Jj scheduled in a non-SPT order in σ
′: Ji is scheduled before Jj , but pi > pj . If
we switch the order of jobs, the jobs Jk executed between Jj and Ji complete earlier. Moreover,
as both agents prefer Jj to Ji, the T tardiness measure drops (Jk are less late in the switched
schedule). Thus, the switched schedule has a lower cost, which contradicts the assumption that σ′
is optimal.
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Next, observe that the sum of agents’ tardiness measures is at least 2s. Consider an SPT
schedule. For each pair of jobs (J
(a)
i , J
(b)
i ), if J
(a)
i is scheduled before J
(b)
i , T (σ, σb) is increased
by pi; otherwise, T (σ, σa) is increased by pi. As T (σ, σa) + T (σ, σb) = 2s, by the convexity of the
Lp-norm (with p > 1), a schedule with the total cost of
p
√
2sp has to be a schedule with the minimal
cost. Further, this cost is equal to p
√
2sp, if and only if the total tardiness of agents a and b are
equal.
Now, observe that the order of a pair of jobs with equal length {J (a)i ), J (b)i )} defines thus the
partition: the order (J
(b)
i , J
(a)
i ) corresponds to si in Sa; the order (J
(a)
i , J
(b)
i ) corresponds to si in
Sb. As T (σ, σa) = T (σ, σb) = s,
∑
si∈Sa si =
∑
si∈Sb si = s.
Moreover, as shown below, max-{T,E,D,SD} is NP-hard even for unit-size jobs.
Theorem 13. For each delay cost f ∈ {T,E,D,SD}, finding a schedule returned by max-f is
NP-hard, even for unit-size jobs.
Proof. We reduce from the ClosestString, which is NP-hard even for the binary alphabet. Let
I be an instance of ClosestString with the binary alphabet. In I we are given a set of n 0/1
strings, each of length m, and an integer d; we ask if there exists a “central string” with the
maximum Hamming distance to the input strings no greater than d.
From I we construct an instance I ′ of max-f collective schedule in the following way. We have
2m jobs: for each i ∈ [m] we introduce two jobs, J (a)i and J (b)i . For each input string s we introduce
one agent: the agent puts a job J
(·)
i before J
(·)
j in her preferred schedule whenever i < j. Further,
she puts J
(a)
i before J
(b)
i if s has “one” in the i-th position and J
(b)
i before J
(a)
i , otherwise.
Let us call a schedule where J
(·)
i is put before J
(·)
j whenever i < j, a regular schedule. We
consider the schedule σ∗ returned by max-f , and we show that this schedule is regular (or that it
can be transformed into a regular schedule of the same cost). Let us consider that there is in σ∗
two jobs J
(·)
i and J
(·)
j such that J
(·)
j is scheduled before J
(·)
i whereas i < j. Swapping J
(·)
j with J
(·)
i
changes only J
(·)
j and J
(·)
i completion times (as jobs are unit-size). By case analysis on both jobs’
positions relative to 2i and 2j (6 cases, as j is before i), for any f ∈ {T,E,D,SD}, swapping these
jobs does not increase f . Thus, if σ∗ is not regular, we can transform it into a regular schedule
as follows: by swapping J
(·)
1 with another job J
(·)
k (if J
(·)
1 is not at position 1 or 2, whereas J
(·)
k ,
with k > 1, is at one of these positions), we do not increase the cost f of the schedule, and thus
we obtain a schedule where the jobs J
(·)
1 are at their regular positions. We continue with at most
2m such swaps for the remaining positions i ∈ [m], ending up with a regular schedule.
Let us now consider that f = T (resp. f = E). Observe that if we put J
(a)
i before J
(b)
i in a
regular schedule, then we increase the tardiness (resp. earliness) of each agent having “zero” in the
i-th position by one. Conversely, if we schedule J
(b)
i before J
(a)
i , then we increase the tardiness (resp.
earliness) of agents having “one” in the i-th position by one. Thus, a (regular) collective schedule
corresponds to a “central string”: J
(a)
i scheduled before J
(b)
i in a collective schedule corresponds
to a central string having “one” in the i-th position, and J
(b)
i scheduled before J
(a)
i , corresponds
to “zero”. With such interpretation, the max-T (resp. max-E) of a regular schedule is simply the
maximum Hamming distance to the input strings. Consequently, we get that the answer to the
initial instance I is “yes”, iff the optimal solution for I ′ is a schedule with max-T (resp. max-E)
not larger than d.
When f = D (resp. f = SD), the principle of the proof is the same: J
(a)
i before J
(b)
i in a
regular schedule increases the deviation (resp. squared deviation) of each agent having “zero” in
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the i-th position by two. Conversely, if we schedule J
(b)
i before J
(a)
i , then we increase the deviation
(resp. squared deviation) of agents having “one” in the i-th position by one. Consequently, we get
that the answer to the initial instance I is “yes”, iff the optimal solution for I ′ is a schedule with
max-D (resp. max-SD) not larger than 2d.
4 Experimental Evaluation
The goal of our experimental evaluation is, first, to demonstrate that, while most of the problems
are NP-hard, an Integer Linear Programming (ILP) solver finds optimal solutions for instances
with reasonable sizes. Second, to quantitatively characterize the impact of collective scheduling
compared to the base social choice methods. Third, to compare schedules built with different
approaches (cost functions and axioms). We use tardiness T as a representative cost function: it
is NP-hard in both Σ and max aggregations; and easy to interpret.
Settings. A single experimental scenario is described by a profile with preferred schedules of the
agents and by a maximum length of a job pmax. We instantiate the preferred schedules of agents
using PrefLib [22]. We treat PrefLib’s candidates as jobs. We use datasets where the agents have
strict preferences over all candidates. We restrict to datasets with both large number of candidates
and large number of agents: we take two datasets on AGH course selection (agh1 with 9 candidates
and 146 agents; and agh2 with 7 candidates and 153 agents) and sushi dataset with 10 candidates
and 5000 agents. Additionally, we generate preferences using the Mallows [21] model (mallows)
and Impartial Culture (impartial), both with 10 candidates and 500 agents. We use three different
values for pmax: 10, 20 and 50. For each experimental scenario we generate 100 instances—in each
instance pick the lengths of the jobs uniformly at random between 1 and pmax (in separate series
of experiments we used exponential and normal distributions; we found similar trends to the ones
discussed below). For each scenario, we present averages and standard deviations over these 100
instances.
Computing Optimal Solutions. We use standard ILP encoding: for each pair of jobs (i, j), we
introduce two binary variables preci,j and precj,i denoting precedence: preci,j = 1 iff i precedes j
in the schedule. (preci,j + precj,i = 1 and, to guarantee transitivity of prec, for each triple i, j, k,
we have preci,j + precj,k − preci,k ≤ 1). We run Gurobi solver on a 6-core (12-thread) PC. An agh
instance takes, on the average, less than a second to solve, while a sushi instance takes roughly 20
seconds. In a separate series of experiments, we analyze the runtime on impartial instances as a
function of number of jobs and number of voters. A 20 jobs, 500 voters instance with
∑
-T goal
takes 8 seconds; while a max-T goal takes two minutes. A 10 jobs, 5000 voters takes 8 seconds
with
∑
-T goal and 28 seconds with max-T goal. Finally, 20 jobs, 5000 voters take 23 seconds
for with
∑
-T and 20 minutes with max-T . For 30 jobs, the solver does not finish in 60 minutes.
Running times depend thus primarily on the number of jobs and on the goal. We conclude that,
while the problem is strongly NP-hard, it can be solved in practice for thousands of voters and up
to 20 jobs. We consider these running times to be satisfactory: first, for a population it might be
difficult to meaningfully express preferences for dozens of jobs [23] (therefore, the decision maker
would probably combine jobs before eliciting preferences); second, gathering preferences takes non-
negligible time; and, finally, in our motivating examples (public works, lecture hall) individual jobs
last hours to weeks.
Analysis of the Results. First, we analyze job’s rank as a function of its length. We compute
a reference collective schedule for an instance with the same agents’ preferences, but unit-size jobs
18
1 2 4 6 8 10
−4
−2
0
2
4
Job length
∆
po
si
ti
on
AGH2
IMPARTIAL
MALLOWS
SUSHI
Σ-T
1 2 4 6 8 10
−4
−2
0
2
4
Job length
∆
po
si
ti
on
AGH2
IMPARTIAL
MALLOWS
SUSHI
max-T
Figure 3: The average change in jobs’ position. A point (x, y) in the plot denotes that a job of
length x is on the average scheduled by y positions later than when we ignore jobs’ durations.
pmax = 10 (pmax = 20 and pmax = 50 show very similar trends.)
Dataset
PTA C. Paradox PTA Copeland ·/·
∆Gini
Σ-T max-T Σ-T max-T
agh1 6% 15% 1.03 1.23 0.07
agh2 5% 18% 1.03 1.28 0.12
sushi 7% 24% 1.02 1.22 0.06
impartial 3% 8% 1.00 1.01 0.00
mallows 10% 24% 1.03 1.21 0.08
Table 1: “PTA C. Paradox” gives the mean frequencies of violating the PTA Condorcet principle
for optimal solutions for Σ-T and max-T . “PTA Copeland ·/·” denotes the ratio of sum/max T for
PTA Copeland’s schedule to their optimums. “∆Gini” shows the average of differences in the Gini
indices: Gini(max-T ) - Gini(Σ-T ).
(it thus corresponds to the classic preference aggregation problem with Σ-T or max-T goal). We
then compute and analyze the collective schedules. Over 100 instances, as jobs’ durations are
assigned randomly, all the jobs’ durations should be in the preferred schedules in, roughly, all
positions. Thus, on the average, short jobs should be executed earlier, and long jobs later than
in the reference schedule (in contrast, in any single experiment, if a large majority puts a short
job at the end of their preferred schedules, the job is not automatically advanced). To confirm
this hypothesis, for each instance and each job we compare its position to the position in the
reference schedule. Figure 3 shows the average position change as a function of the job lengths. In
collective schedules, short jobs (e.g., of size 1) are advanced, on the average, 2-4 positions in the
schedule, compared to schedules corresponding to the standard preference aggregation problem.
The experiments thus confirm that the lengths of the jobs have profound impact on the schedule.
Second, we check how frequent are PTA-Condorcet paradoxes. For each instance, we counted
how many out of
(
m
2
)
job pairs are scheduled in a non-PTA-Condorcet consistent order. Table 1
shows that both Σ-T and max-T often violate the PTA Condorcet principle. Table 1 also shows
the average ratio between the (Σ and max) tardiness of schedules returned by the PTA Copeland’s
rule, and the tardiness of optimal corresponding schedules. These ratios are small: roughly 3%
degradation for Σ and 24% for max. Thus, though PTA Copeland’s rule does not explicitly optimize
max-T and Σ-T , on average, it returns schedules close to the optimal for these criteria.
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Third, we analyze how fair are Σ-T and max-T . We analyzed Gini indices of the vectors of
agents’ tardiness. Table 1 shows that, interestingly, Σ-T is more fair (smaller average Gini index),
even though max-T seemingly cares more about less satisfied agents. Yet, the focus of max-T
on the worst-off agent makes it effectively ignore all the remaining agents, increasing the societal
inequality.
5 Discussion and Conclusions
The principal contribution of this paper is conceptual—we introduce the notion of the collective
schedule. We believe that collective scheduling addresses natural problems involving jobs or events
having diverse impacts on the society. Such problems do not fit well into existing scheduling models.
We demonstrated how to formalize the notion of the collective schedule by extending well-known
methods from social choice. While collective scheduling is closely related to preference aggregation,
these methods have to be extended to take into account lengths of jobs. Notably, we proposed
to judge the quality of a collective schedule by comparing the jobs’ completion times between
the collective and the agents’ preferred schedules. We also showed how to extend the Condorcet
principle to take into account lengths of jobs.
We conclude that there is no clear winner among the proposed scheduling mechanisms. Sim-
ilarly, in the classic voting, there is no clear consensus regarding which voting mechanism is the
best. For example, we showed that the comparison of the cost-based and PTA-Condorcet-based
scheduling exposes a tradeoff between reinforcement and the PTA Condorcet principle. Thus, the
question which mechanism to choose is, for example, influenced by the subjective assessment of the
mechanism designer with respect to which one of the two properties she considers more important.
Our main conclusion from the theoretical analysis of computational complexity and from the
experimental analysis is that using cost-based scheduling methods is feasible only if the sizes of the
input instances are moderate (though, these instances may represent many realistic situations). In
contrast, PTA Condorcet-based methods are feasible even for large instances. We drew a boundary
between NP-hard and polynomial-time solvable problems. In several cases, problems become NP-
hard with non-unit jobs, therefore showing additional complexity stemming from scheduling, as
opposed to standard voting. Moreover, our experiments suggest that there is a clearly visible
difference between schedules returned by different methods of collective scheduling.
Both scheduling and social choice are well-developed fields with a plethora of models, methods
and results. It is natural to consider more complex scheduling models in the context of collective
scheduling, such as processing several jobs simultaneously (multiple processors with sequential
or parallel jobs), jobs with different release dates or dependencies between jobs. Each of these
extensions raises new questions on computability/approximability of collective schedules. Another
interesting direction is to derive desired properties of collective schedules (distinct from PTA-
Condorcet), and then formulate scheduling algorithms satisfying them.
Acknowledgments
This research has been partly supported by the Polish National Science Center grant Sonata (UMO-
2012/07/D/ST6/02440), a Polonium grant (joint programme of the French Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, the Ministry of Science and Higher Education and the Polish Ministry of Science and
Higher Education) and project TOTAL that has received funding from the European Research
Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme
(grant agreement No 677651).
20
Piotr Skowron was also supported by a Humboldt fellowship for postdoctoral researchers.
References
[1] A. Agnetis, P. B. Mirchandani, D. Pacciarelli, and A. Pacifici. Scheduling problems with two
competing agents. Operations research, 52(2):229–242, 2004.
[2] A. Agnetis, J. Billaut, S. Gawiejnowicz, D. Pacciarelli, and A. Soukhal. Multiagent Scheduling:
Models and Algorithms. Springer, 2014.
[3] K. J. Arrow, A. Sen, and K. Suzumura, editors. Handbook of Social Choice & Welfare, vol-
ume 2. Elsevier, 2010.
[4] G. Benade, S. Nath, A. Procaccia, and N. Shah. Preference elicitation for participatory bud-
geting. In Proceedings of the 31st Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-2017), pages
376–382, 2017.
[5] P. Brucker. Scheduling Algorithms. Springer, 2006.
[6] Y. Cabannes. Participatory budgeting: a significant contribution to participatory democracy.
Environment and Urbanization, 16(1):27–46, 2004.
[7] I. Caragiannis, E. Hemaspaandra, and L. A. Hemaspaandra. Dodgson’s rule and Young’s rule.
In F. Brandt, V. Conitzer, U. Endriss, J. Lang, and A. D. Procaccia, editors, Handbook of
Computational Social Choice, chapter 2. Cambridge University Press, 2015.
[8] E. Celis, D. Straszak, and N. Vishnoi. Ranking with fairness constraints. Technical Report
arXiv:1704.06840, arXiv.org, 2017.
[9] J. Colomer. Ramon Llull: from ‘Ars electionis’ to social choice theory. Social Choice and
Welfare, 40(2):317–328, 2013.
[10] J. Du and J. Leung. Minimizing total tardiness on one machine is np-hard. Mathematics of
operations research, 15(3):483–495, 1990.
[11] P. F. Dutot, F. Pascual, K. Rzadca, and D. Trystram. Approximation algorithms for the mul-
tiorganization scheduling problem. IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems,
22(11), 2011.
[12] C. Dwork, R. Kumar, M. Naor, and D. Sivakumar. Rank aggregation methods for the web.
In Proceedings of the 10th international conference on World Wide Web (WWW-2001), pages
613–622. ACM, 2001.
[13] B. Fain, A. Goel, and K. Munagala. The core of the participatory budgeting problem. In
Proceedings of the 12th Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE-2016), pages
384–399, 2016.
[14] P. Faliszewski, P. Skowron, A. Slinko, and N. Talmon. Multiwinner voting: A new challenge
for social choice theory. In U. Endriss, editor, Trends in Computational Social Choice. AI
Access, 2017.
21
[15] F. Fischer, O. Hudry, and R. Niedermeier. Weighted tournament solutions. In F. Brandt,
V. Conitzer, U. Endriss, J. Lang, and A. D. Procaccia, editors, Handbook of Computational
Social Choice, chapter 2. Cambridge University Press, 2015.
[16] A. Goel, A. Krishnaswamy, S. Sakshuwong, and T. Aitamurto. Knapsack voting: Voting
mechanisms for participatory budgeting. Manuscript, 2016.
[17] M. G. Kendall. A new measure of rank correlation. Biometrika, 30(1/2):81–93, 1938.
[18] E. Koutsoupias and C. H. Papadimitriou. Worst-case equilibria. Computer Science Review, 3
(2):65–69, 2009.
[19] J. Lang and L. Xia. Voting over multiattribute domains. In F. Brandt, V. Conitzer, U. Endriss,
J. Lang, and A. Procaccia, editors, Handbook of Computational Social Choice, chapter 9.
Cambridge University Press, 2015.
[20] J. Levin and B. Nalebuff. An introduction to vote-counting schemes. Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 9(1):3–26, 1995.
[21] C. L. Mallows. Non-null ranking models. I. Biometrika, 44(1-2):114–130, June 1957.
[22] N. Mattei and T. Walsh. Preflib: A library for preferences http: //www.preflib.org. In
Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory (ADT-2013),
pages 259–270, 2013.
[23] G. Miller. The magical number seven, plus or minus two: Some limits on our capacity for
processing information. The Psychological Review, 63:81–97, 1956.
[24] PBP. PBP. Where has it worked?—the participatory budgeting project. www.
participatorybudgeting.org/
about-participatory-budgeting/where-has-it-worked, 2016.
[25] P. Skowron, P. Faliszewski, and J. Lang. Finding a collective set of items: From proportional
multirepresentation to group recommendation. Artificial Intelligence, 241:191–216, 2016.
[26] P. Skowron, M. Lackner, M. Brill, D. Peters, and E. Elkind. Proportional rankings. In
Proceedings of the 24th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-2017),
pages 409–415, 2017.
[27] B. Vo¨cking. Selfish load balancing. In Algorithmic Game Theory. Cambridge, 2007.
[28] H. Young and A. Levenglick. A consistent extension of Condorcet’s election principle. SIAM
Journal on Applied Mathematics, 35(2):285–300, 1978.
22
